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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Section 78-22(3)(j), Utah Code Anno., as amended, for orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of
record over which the Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction.

1

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Appellant submits the following statement of the issue presented by this appeal:
A.

The trial court erred in its interpretation and application of the legal definition

of a "natural disaster" as it applied to the undisputed facts on summary judgment.
Standard of Review:
On an appeal from a summary judgment, the trial court's order of dismissal is
reviewed for correctness. St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp.. 811 P.2d 194,196
(Utah 1991). Further, issues of statutory construction present a question of law for the Court
to determine for correctness. Beaver County v. Utah State Tax Com'n, 916 P.2d 344 (Utah
1996).
This issue was preserved in the trial court by reason of the Appellant's opposition
[Rec. at 195-217 and 228-237] to the Appellees' respective Motions for Summary Judgment,
and statements made during oral argument [Rec at 294].

2

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
The following statutes whose interpretation is determinative on appeal or are of
central importance include, in pertinent part:
Section 63-30-3, Utah Code Anno., as amended (1991): [See addendum]
(I) Except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter, all
governmental entities are immune from suit for any injury which results from
the exercise of a governmental function, governmentally-owned hospital,
nursing home, or other governmental health care facility, and from an
approved medical, nursing, or other professional health care clinical training
program conducted in either public or private facilities.
(3) The management offloodwaters and other natural disasters and the
construction, repair, and operation of flood and storm systems by
governmental entities are considered to be governmental functions, and
governmental entities and their officers and employees are immunefromsuit
for any injury or damage resulting from those activities.
Section 63-30-10, Utah Code Anno., as amended (1991): [See addendum]
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury
proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed
within the scope of employment except if the injury arises out of, in
connection with, or results from:
(II) any natural condition on publicly owned or controlled
lands, any condition existing in connection with an abandoned
mine or mining operation, or any activity authorized by the
School and Institutional Trust Lands Administration or the
Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands;
(13) the management of flood waters, earthquakes, or natural
disasters;
(18) the activities of:
(d) emergency evacuations
3

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES [Cont'd]

Sections 63-5A-2(4) and 53-2-102(8), U.C.A.: [See addendum]
"Disaster" means a situation causing, or threatening to cause, widespread
damage, social disruption, or injury or loss of life or property resulting from
attack, internal disturbance, natural phenomena, or technological hazard.

4

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
This is an action for personal injuries sustained by Appellant as a result of the

Appellees' combined negligence in failing to protect Appellant from a second avalanche
occurring in the Little Cottonwood Canyon in March of 1998. It was alleged below that the
Appellees, despite having specific knowledge of a known risk and danger present on the
subject day, nevertheless, placed Appellant in harm's way and danger by ordering the
stopping of Appellant's vehicle directly under an avalanche area while Appellees cleared the
road of snow further ahead.
Appellees filed respective Motions for Summary Judgment asserting that the
Governmental Immunity Act, §63-30-3 and §63-30-10 shielded the entities from liability
since each was alleged to have been involved in the management of a "natural disaster"; i.e.
an avalanche.
Appellant countered that, at the time of the accident, the Appellees were not involved
in the management of a "natural disaster" as that term is defined under U.C.A., Section 6330-3(3). Appellant further argued that because the Appellees only function at the time was
directing traffic around snow that had fallen into the roadway and partially blocked the flow
of traffic exiting the canyon, that such activity did not constitute a governmental function for
which immunity could be sought. Other than traffic management and snow removal issues,
there was no evidence before the trial court that established a "natural disaster" had occurred
from which immunity could be granted.
5

B.

Statement of Facts
1.

In March, 1998, Appellant, Mr. Blackner, was driving his vehicle up the

canyon road known as "Little Cottonwood Canyon." Rec at 212, ^[2.
2.

At approximately 2:19 p.m. an avalanche occurred in the White Pine Chutes

area, herein referred to as "avalanche No. 1," which flowed onto the canyon road and
partially blocked the downhill lane of travel. Rec. at 165. ^ 4.
3.

A UDOT employee was involved in the control of traffic at the first avalanche

site. Rec. at 165.^4. In order to remove the snowfromthe lane of traffic, afront-endloader
was summonedfromthe Snowbird Ski Resort to remove the snow that was blocking traffic.
Rec. at 193, If 6.
4.

The only concern resulting from the first avalanche was that traffic moving

around the snow might collide with each other. No property was damaged and no injury or
loss of life occurred with avalanche No. 1. Rec. at 193, % 5.
5.

As Mr. Blackner proceeded up the canyon he came upon a lead vehicle,

specifically a Snowbird service truck. Mr. Medara, a UDOT employee with radio contact
at all times, was travelling eastbound in the same direction and drove into the left lane
passing all of the vehicles stopped for the clean up process further ahead. Rec at 212, If 2.
6.

Mr. Medara continued to drive his vehicle up the canyon until he reached an

area below where avalanche No. 1 had spilled some snow onto the road surface. Mr. Medara
then stopped his service truck in the roadway, which was under a completely different
avalanche location. Rec at 212. ^f 3. This was the location where avalanche No.2 occurred.
6

7.

Prior to and at the time Mr. Blackner was required to stop his vehicle, there

were no warnings received from any UDOT or other governmental employee that a danger
existed in the location where Mr. Blackner and Mr. Medara had stopped their vehicles. The
government had knowingly stopped traffic in a slide area. Rec at 212. ^[4 .
8.

At no time were there any warnings or instructions indicating that an

emergency or evacuation was underway. Rec. at 212. ^[5.
9.

While waiting for the snow to be removed from the road further ahead, Mr.

Blackner and others had exited their vehicles, where the government permitted/instructed
them to stop, and were watching the snow removal process occurring a few hundred yards
up the road. Rec. at 212. ^f 6 .
10.

At no time did Mr. Blackner ever consider himself to be in danger or in an

emergency or evacuation situation given that a UDOT avalanche control employee and two
Snowbird employees were with him and had required his stop. Rec. at 212. ^ 7.
11.

The traffic proceeding up the canyon should not have been stopped in the

White Pine Chutes area, since that area has a long history of avalanche incidents. Rec. at
215 [Mr. Dave Medara "Narrative of Avalanche Incident" (""Medara Statement"].
12.

There are designated "safe zones" in the canyon that were not used to stop

traffic on the subject day. Medara Statement. Rec. at 216.
13.

While stopped in the White Pine Chutes area, avalanche No.2 came down and

destroyed several vehicles (carrying them off the mountainside) and caused Mr. Blackner
serious personal injury.
7

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Appellees moved the lower Court for a legal determination that there can be no
liability affixed based upon a purported immunity under one or more sections of Utah Code
Ann. § 63-30-1 et seq.

Appellees contended below that even if found to have been

negligent, such negligent conduct is shielded by operation of the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann., § 63-30-3 and § 63-30-10(11)(13) and (18)(d), specifically
claiming immunity due to a "natural condition on a public land, the management of natural
disasters, or the activities of emergency evacuations. Rec at 158-9.
The Appellees alleged any such negligent conduct fell within the purview of one or
more of the above-stated "exceptions," sovereign immunity for such has not been waived,
thus divesting the lower court of subject matter jurisdiction. The plain language of Section
63-30-10 implies negligent conduct on the part of a governmental employee, unless the
proximate cause of the injury is confined to one of the enumerated exceptions.
The lower court confined its ruling to the question of whether the Appellees were
involved in the "management of a natural disaster" while clearing the snow from avalanche
No. 1, and that by reason of that activity, Appellant's injuries from avalanche No.2 resulted
from or are related with the government's activity at avalanche No. 1 further up the road.
Rec. at 294. Page 16. lines 9-18. The Court did not consider, but assumed the issue of duty
in this setting.
What should be inescapable to this Court during its review is what appears to be the
actual cause of Appellant's injuries is not necessarily the proximate cause. It is contended
8

here that the lower court merely considered the "actual" cause to remove the governmental
entities from liability. In this case, an avalanche can, by statutory definition, only be a
"natural phenomenon," which upon the happening of injury or damage is elevated to the
status of a "disaster." Appellees below offered no evidence of injury, or even to the extent
that there was a threat of such.
The singular reason that Appellant was injured in the second unrelated avalanche is
due to the negligent act of one or more of the Appellees in permitting/causing canyon traffic
to stop under a known avalanche area, while snow was plowed off the roadway further
ahead. Plowing snow from a roadway should not be classified as a "disaster."
Although Appellees raised other issues in support of their respective motions for
summary judgment, the lower court's ruling was wholly premised upon the inference that the
government entities were involved in the "management of a natural disaster". It is that
flawed inference that is challenged on this appeal as being beyond the scope of the statutory
definition and evidence presented by the Appellees below.

ARGUMENT
Standards governing motions for summary judgment
On an appeal from a summary judgment, the trial court's order of dismissal is
reviewed for correctness. St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St Benedict's Hosp.. 811 P.2d 194,196
(Utah 1991). Questions oflaw, are reviewed for correctness. In re Estate of West 948 P.2d
at 353 (Utah 1997). Since summary judgment is granted as a matter oflaw rather than fact,
9

the appellate court isfreeto reappraise the trial court's legal conclusions. Barbery. Farmers
Ins. Exch., 751 P.2d 248 (Utah App. 1988).

POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS INTERPRETATION OF THE LEGAL DEFINITION OF A
"NATURAL DISASTER1 F AS IT APPLIED TO THE UNDISPUTED FACTS ON SUMMARY
JUDGMENT,

The lower court ruled that UDOT and Alta's conduct on the day of the subject
accident involved the management of a "natural disaster," and therefore Appellant's injuries
arose out of or in connection with such activity thereby entitling both Appellees to
governmental immunity under Section 63-30-3 and 63-30-10, Utah Code Anno., as amended.
Rec. at 294. page 16. lines 9-18. This was the singular basis for the lower court's ruling as
established by the record below.
The lower court's comments at oral argument demonstrate that it erroneously
expanded the definition of what constitutes a "disaster" to a case where there was NO such
evidence presented by the moving party. The lower court apparently misunderstood the
precise "activity" being undertaken by governmental and private entities prior to the second
avalanche that struck Appellant (avalanche No.2) and others as they waited for the road to
be cleared ahead. The lower court commented:
...it's the Court's view that the intention as communicated by the
legislature in this statute is that — a disaster is a situation that causes
widespread damage to property that results from natural phenomenon.
And in the Court's view this sort of condition would follow in the
description of "widespread damage" and would therefore be within the
10

statute and would allow the immunity to the entities that are sued here as
Defendants.
Transcript of hearing on Motions for Summary Judgment Rec. at 294, Page 16, lines 9-18.
In its conclusion, the lower court determined that the statute, presumably referring to
Section 63-5A-2(4) or 53-2-102(8), U.C.A., required the finding of "widespread damage,"
although no damage was alleged or found, nonetheless ruled that the clean up from avalanche
No. 1 was a "disaster." The parties were in agreement at oral argument that there were two
distinct events, resulting from two distinct avalanches.

The attorney for U.D.O.T.

represented to the lower court the following:
[Ms. Steinvoort:] I think the facts are fairly undisputed in terms of a
situation on that particular day. It is a state road. U.D.O.T. has the sole
authority to close that road. An avalanche occurred. If you look at the
diagram here, White Pine Chute, Number 3, which traveled to one lane of
traffic on the road, preventing traffic from going up and down the canyon.
U.D.O.T. was called. The avalanche forecaster, Dave Medara, arrived at the
scene, evaluated it. The Alta Town Marshal also came to the scene to help
coordinate traffic. Mr. Medara continued down the road, came back and
noticed that all of the traffic was stopped because a front-end loader was
removing the snow from the road. It was at that time that the second
avalanche occurred and then knocked everyone off the road.
This is a situation where U.D.O.T. did not trigger the avalanche. It
wasn't an avalanche control effort. It was an unexpected situation.
Rec. at 294, pg. 3:9-22.
The lower court's ruling in this case plainly, and erroneously, rested upon a notion that
the first avalanche was classified as a "natural disaster." Nothing could be further from the
truth. Counsel for Appellee Town of Alta represented as follows:
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[Mr. Richards:] Kevin Payne, Alta's Deputy Town Marshal, says,
"Fine. Let's call afront-endloader in from Snowbird and get this debris off
the road," because traffic was trying to make its way around this using one
lane and he saw the danger in that. And while Medara went down, Payne
continued to allow one lane to go and stop it, allow the other lane to go until
thefront-endloader arrived ten or fifteen minutes later. Thefront-endloader
went to work and in a matter of about ten minutes had most of the snow
pushed off.
Rec. at 294, page 6. lines 11-19.
The representations made by both defense counsel was that there were two distinct
avalanches that occurred. The first avalanche only required minimal efforts to control traffic
and to remove snow. It is during those passive activities that UDOT realizes that traffic has
been stopped directly underneath a known and dangerous avalanche zone. The radio
communication made by Mr. Medara to those clearing the snow that the Government had
unnecessarily created a new danger. There were two distinct and separate avalanches, and
only the second one could be classified as a natural disaster since it injured people and caused property damage. The Appellees were not managing the second avalanche since it
had not yet occurred.
For clarification to avoid further confusion, the record shows that the initial avalanche
merely flowed onto the canyon road and covered the downhill lane of travel. Rec. at 193,
J4. The governmental and private entities were involved in the removal of snow from the
road [Rec. at 193, ^[6]. and for the control of traffic in that area [Rec. at 193,^5]. There is
no evidence in the record, and none was proffered by Appellees, that there was any
"widespread damage" that had occurred as a result of the FIRST avalanche,
12

It is during this clean up process that the second avalanche occurred that hit several
vehicles that were stopped further below the clean up process at the direction of UDOT and
Alta City personnel. In order for there to be governmental immunity available under Section
63-30-3(3) or 63-30-10(11), U.C.A., it must be demonstrated that the proximate cause of
Appellant's injuries occurred during and as a result of the Appellees' management of a natural
disaster as it related to avalanche No. 1. The lower court had no such evidence.
To that end, since a claim of immunity is an affirmative defense, the defendant bears
the burden of proving the elements necessary to establish the defense. See Nelson By and
Through Stuckman v. Salt Lake Citv, 919 P.2d 568 (Utah 1996). The lower court based its
ruling upon an erroneous interpretation of the events as constituting a "natural disaster,"
when, more correctly, there was no "disaster" until the second avalanche occurred.
Appellant submitted that the only reason a "disaster" occurred from the second avalanche is
due to the Appellees' negligent act of literally stopping traffic in the second, active avalanche
zone. There is not a shred of evidence to support a finding that the first avalanche amounted
to a natural disaster, which is what the Appellees argued below and would need to prove to
establish immunity under either Section 63-30-3(3) or 63-30-10(11), U.C.A..
It is well-settled that "once the moving party has brought forth evidence either tending
to prove a lack of genuine issue of material fact or challenging the existence of one of the
elements of the cause of action, the nonmoving party then bears the burden of'providfing]
some evidence, by affidavit or otherwise, in support of the essential elements of his [or her]
claim.'"
13

Thavne v. Beneficial Utah, Inc.. 874 P.2d 120, 124 (Utah 1994).

However, before

determining whether the nonmoving party must meet its burden, the court must be satisfied
that the moving party has met its burden of proving that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Utah R.
Civ. P. 56(e).
In the instant case, the district court improperly granted UDOTs and Alta's motions
for summary judgment because there was a complete lack of evidence to establish that the
Appellees were involved in the "management of a natural disaster", or more appropriately
resulted from "widespread damage," when they were simply plowing snow from the road.
In order to make such an initial showing, it was necessary to submit evidence of the elements
that constitute a "disaster" as that term is defined by Utah law. No evidence was submitted,
since none was available. The Appellees failed to satisfy their initial burden. Appellant
would submit that, to the extent there was a lack of credible evidence from which the lower
court could render judgment, it erred in granting summary judgment on that basis alone.
Section 63-30-3, Utah Code Anno., as amended provides in relevant part:
(1) Except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter, all
governmental entities are immune from suit for any injury which results
from the exercise of a governmental function, ..•
• •••

(3) The management of... natural disasters ... [is] considered to be
[a] governmental function[s], and governmental entities and their officers
and employees are immune from suit for any injury or damage resulting
from those activities.

14

According to the above statute, governmental immunity will apply when the
governmental entity is engaged in the "management of a natural disaster" and injuries result
from the exercise of such management. On the other hand, if injuries result from activity
other than the management of a natural disaster, in this setting at least, there is no immunity
for negligence of State and municipal employees, unless otherwise provided for by law. In
this case, the lower court's analysis ended upon application of Section 63-30-3, U.C.A. and
its broad definition of "disaster."
To sustain the lower court's ruling that UDOT and Alta were involved in the
"management of a natural disaster" there must be evidence that the first avalanche was a
"natural disaster."
In Sections 63-5A-2(4) and 53-2-102(8), U.C.A., a "disaster" is defined as:
"Disaster" means a situation causing, or threatening to cause, widespread
damage, social disruption, or injury or loss of life or property resulting from
attack, internal disturbance, natural phenomena, or technological hazard.
It is undisputed in this case that, unlike a "disaster", an avalanche in its purist sense
is considered a "natural phenomenon." See Section 53-2-102(8), U.C.A. Conversely stated,
a natural phenomena does not a "disaster" make. Although the first avalanche the Appellees
were cleaning up was, by statutory definition, a "natural phenomenon," it did not fit the
definition of a "disaster" since it did not create a situation causing, or even threatening to
cause (1) widespread damage; (2) social disruption; (3) injury; (4) loss of life; or (5) loss of
property. The avalanche had occurred without incident and became, again, a static condition
of snow. Any other "cause" than listed by statute, is simply not considered to be a "disaster."
15

The only "disaster" involved in this case was actually caused by the Appellees when they
literally and unnecessarily chose to stop cars under a known, separate (2nd) avalanche zone,
and a risk known to them at the time. See Rec. at 165-166,fflf7 and 8. This second
avalanche was a "disaster" of Appelleesy own design.
At no time was it argued or even suggested that the clean up activity from the first
avalanche "caused" any of the above listed criteria to satisfy the definition of a "disaster."
They have not alleged any widespread damage or social disruption caused by the clean up,
nor can they. In fact, the only damage done was by the later second avalanche the Appellant
was trapped in. It is undisputed that there was no loss of life or even an injury to anyone or
any property resulting from the cleanup of the snow that had fallen onto the road from the
first avalanche.
In this regard, the lower court erred by concluding that UDOT and Alta were involved
in the "management of a natural disaster" in cleaning up the first avalanche, and further erred
by concluding it was a situation that caused "widespread damage" creating a natural disaster
and thereby affording governmental immunity.
In an analogous case, Nelson By and Through Stuckman v. Salt Lake City. 919 P.2d
568 (Utah 1996), this Court ruled that governmental immunity did not shield the City and
State's conduct in failing to maintain a fence along the Jordan River, through which a small
boy entered and drowned in the canal. The parties disputed whether the cause of the child's
drowning arose out of the Jordan River, which is a natural condition, or out of the breach in
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the fence, which is not. Immunity was sought on grounds that the Jordan River was a natural
condition on public land and actions arising therefrom for injury were prohibited.1
In Nelson, the Court distinguished between the actual cause of the minors death from
the proximate cause. The State argued that the Jordan River was the actual cause of the
death, where the plaintiff argued that the breach in the fence was the proximate cause. The
Nelson Court found that although the Jordan River was imdoubtedly the actual cause of
injury, it may not be the proximate cause. IcL at 574, (citing Little Am. Ref. Co. v. Leyba.
641 P.2d 112 (Utah 1982)). Furthermore, "p]t is commonplace in the law that an act,
omission, orforce may be an actual cause, but not a proximate cause." Bennion v. LeGrand
Johnson Constr. Co., 701 P.2d 1078, 1083 (Utah 1982).
Lastly, in Nelson, the Court addressed an issue more related to the imposition of a
duty upon the governmental entity and held:
For numerous policy reasons, the Legislature saw fit to grant
governmental entities immunity for injuries resulting from natural waterways
and other natural conditions. Utah's vast public lands that are open to the
public for recreational uses present all kinds of hazards arising from their
natural conditions. Holding the government liable for injuries arising from
such hazards would no doubt result in significant restrictions or even
prohibitions on the use of such lands. The State and other governmental
entities cannot be expected to erect a fence around every waterway or
potentially hazardous condition located on public property. See Brinkerhoff
v. Salt Lake City, 13 Utah 2d 214, 215, 371 P.2d 211, 212 (1962); Sehv v.
Salt Lake Citv. 41 Utah 535.537,126 P. 691 (1912). Clearly persons who use
unimproved lands must assume some risk of injury.

1

Appellees here argue that immunity exists since an avalanche is also considered as a
natural condition. Rec. at 294, pg3.
17

The case before us, however, involves different circumstances. By
constructing the fence that separates Riverside Park from the Jordan River
Parkway, the City or State undertook to provide protection. Having done so,
the responsible party is obligated to exercise reasonable care in maintaining
the fence. See Weber v. Springville Citv. 725 P.2d 1360, 1364 (Utah 1986);
DCR Inc. v. Peak Alarm Co.. 663 P.2d 433, 436 (Utah 1983). Failure to do
so could give rise to liability on the part of the responsible party. Thus, we
hold that Nelson's suit is not barred by section 63-30-10(11) of the
Governmental Immunity Act. [Citations in original].
Nelson, 919 P.2d 568, 575 (Utah 1996).
Here, as in Nelson, this case involves circumstances where UDOT and Alta
consciously undertook action to protect motoristsfromeach other, not avalanche No, 1. This
was simple traffic control and nothing further. They were not clearing or managing a natural
disaster, but were only involved in plowing snow from a road that required minor traffic
control. UDOT and Alta did, however, put in motion the events that created a disaster from
a second avalanche.
It is doubtful that the Legislature intended to protect governmental agencies from their
negligence in creating disasters, especially when the public is permitted to enter and remain
in an active and known avalanche zone. Knowingly placing the public or an individual in
harm's way should not qualify for immunity under any scenario. If a private person did such
an act, it would be met swiftly by criminal prosecution.
The lower court's comment that "this sort of condition would follow in the
description of "widespread damage" and would therefore be within the statute" [Rec.
at 294] was based upon a lack of any credible evidence to warrant a finding that the first
avalanche was classified as a "natural disaster."
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The primary role of statutory interpretation is to "give effect to the intent of the
legislature in light of the purpose the statute was meant to achieve" Sullivan v. Scoular
Grain Co. of Utah. 853 P.2d 877,880 (Utah 1993) (quoting Reeves v. Gentile. 813 P.2d 111,
115 (Utah 1991)). The best indicator of that intent is the plain language of the statute. State
v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1357 (Utah 1993). Furthermore, "[a] general rule of statutory
construction is that a statute should be construed as a comprehensive whole." Beaver
County v. Utah State Tax Com'n. 916 P.2d 344 (Utah 1996).

An issue of statutory

construction presents a question of law for the Court to determine. IdL
The Utah Supreme Court has set forth three (3) rules of statutory construction. First,
the terms of a statute should be interpreted in accord with their usual and accepted meanings.
Utah County v. Orem Citv, 699 P.2d 707,708 (Utah 1985). Second, a statute should not be
construed in a piecemeal fashion but as a comprehensive whole. Peay v. Board of Ed. of
Provo Citv Schools, 377 P.2d 490, 492 (Utah 1962). Finally, "fi]f there is doubt or
uncertainty as to the meaning or application of the provisions ofan act, it is appropriate to
analyze the act in its entirety, in light of its objective, and to harmonize its provisions in
accordance with its intent and purpose." Osuala v. Aetna Life & Casualty, 608 P.2d 242,
243 (Utah 1980).
The singular issue on this appeal is that the lower court erred by concluding, as a
matter of law, that employees of UDOT and the City of Alta were involved in the
"management of a natural disaster" prior to and at the time of the avalanche which hit the
Appellant. It is of utmost importance that this Court continually remind itself that the first
19

avalanche that ran onto the downhill lane did not cause, or threaten to cause, widespread
damage, social disruption, or injury or loss of life or property. The only potential for injury
or property damage recognized at that time, as testified to by Alta1 s Deputy Sheriff, was from
motorists potentially colliding into each other. Rec at 193, If 5. There were no reported
accidents, injury, or property damage involved by reason of the traffic control efforts at the
avalanche No. 1 location.
For those reasons, the lower court erred by failing to apply the statutory definition in
Sections 63-5A-2(4) and 53-2-102(8), U.C.A., as to what constitutes a "natural disaster" to
the undisputed facts pertaining to the governments' activities in clearing the snow on the
roadway and traffic control resulting from the first avalanche. There was no evidence before
the lower court for it to have concluded, as a matter of law, that there existed "a situation
causing, or threatening to cause, widespread damage, social disruption, or injury or loss
of life or property resulting from... natural phenomena9*'.
The lower court's order granting summary judgment against Appellant should be
reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings.
POINT II
SUSTAINING THE LOWER COURTvS RULING IS
CONTRARY TO SOUND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

This is a case where the governmental entities seek shelter from its alleged negligent
acts under a guise that the Appellant was injured while UDOT and the City of Alta were
involved in the "management of a natural disaster." To the contrary, the governmental
20

entities were involved in the maintenance of a public road by clearing snow from the
downhill lane of travel.
It is well-settled that a governmental entity "has a nondelegable duty to exercise due
care in maintaining streets within its corporate boundaries in a reasonably safe condition for
travel, Murray v. Ogden City, 548 P.2d 896 (Utah 1976); Sweet v. Salt Lake City, 43 Utah
306, 134 P. 1167 (1913); Bills v. Salt Lake Citv, 37 Utah 507, 109 P. 745 (1910), and the
city may be held liable for injuries proximately resulting from its failure to do so." Nyman
v.Cedar Citv. 12 Utah 2d 45,36lP.2d 1114 (1961). See also U.C.A., 1953, §§41-6-22 and
63-30-8. Whether a governmental entity has fulfilled its duty to maintain the streets in a safe
condition is a question of fact to be determined by the jury. See Shugren v. Salt Lake City.
48 Utah 320, 159 P. 530 (1916).
The lower court's expansion of the statutory definition of the governments' activities
on the subject day as constituting the "management of a natural disaster" has effectively
wiped out the long-standing rule that the government is responsible for public safety during
maintenance of its roadways.

In so doing, it has also overwhelmingly broadened

governmental immunity by expanding the clear and limited definition of what constitutes a
"disaster." This duty is further supported by the law which imposes liability where the
exposure to harm is created by the government's act or omission. Nelson By and Through
Stuckman v. Salt Lake City. 919 P.2d 568 (Utah 1996). Such are the facts of this case.
With the increasing importance of Utah's wintersport industry and the approaching
Olympics bringing the world to the doorstep of Salt Lake City, including our canyons, the
21

governmental entities will have an enormous task of tunneling thousands of people in and
out of the canyons. The general duty of public safety will be taken to new heights, and with
that comes a greater duty of care. The district court's ruling dilutes the Legislature's intent
to classify elements of nature into distinct categories, which the Legislature obviously
reasoned that a spectacle of nature remains a wonderment until it breaches the sanctity of
public safety.
To uphold the lower court's ambiguous application of its definition of a "natural
disaster" as simply being snow on a roadway, the process of clearing snow or diverting
traffic becomes a "natural disaster" almost anywhere and not just confined to the canyons.
The effect of such a ruling is overwhelming.
In this case there was no breach of public safety created by the spectacle of the first
avalanche, which only placed some snow on a roadway without causing any injury or
damage whatsoever. UDOT and Alta claim immunity for traffic management and would
suggest that the snow in the road at least constituted a "threat" to the public safety. Such a
broad application of the statutory definition of "disaster" would mean that simple snowfall
on the road amounts to a threat of injury to the public and would place Utah in a constant
state of "natural disaster" in the winter months.
This same analysis can be made for other natural phenomena including earthquakes,
floods, storms, drought, or fire. Applying the lower court's broad definition to any one of
the above natural occurrences could interpret a rain storm to be classified as a natural disaster
under a threat of injury analysis.

The sweeping effect of such a ruling would place
22

tremendous burdens upon State and local agencies to manage such occurrences in order to
qualify for immunity, not to mention the added burdens upon the judicial system.
The myriad of possible claims premised on the broad classification of "disaster"
frustrates common sense. State and local resources providing disaster relief would be
plagued by every citizen who considered themselves threatened by a simple storm. Such a
result is non-sensical and certainly not intended by the Legislature when it classified "nature"
in terms of "conditions," "phenomena", and "disasters." Each successive condition produces
a worsening result, yet each have the potential to be disasters. Potential for causing damage
or injury is not analogous to "disaster."
This case clearly does not satisfy the elements to create a disaster. There is no
question that the second avalanche truly became a disaster, and there is no dispute there. The
problem is that the second avalanche only became a disaster under the negligent direction
of the government when it determined to stop traffic under a known slide area. The error in
this case is classifying the FIRST avalanche as a natural disaster and that the local authorities
were in some greater fashion "managing" it. The statutory definition and Legislative intent
in this regard is far surpassed, and infringes upon a greater public service.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons and legal analysis, the decision of the lower court should
be reversed and the matter remanded for trial on the merits. The Court should further rule
that, based upon the undisputed facts presented, the Appellees are not entitled to immunity
in this matter.
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This Court ruled in Nelson Bv and Through Stuckman v. Salt Lake Citv, 919 P.2d 568
(Utah 1996) that:
The case before us, however, involves different circumstances. By
constructing the fence that separates Riverside Park from the Jordan
River Parkway, the City or State undertook to provide protection. Having
done so, the responsible party is obligated to exercise reasonable care in
maintaining the fence. See Weber v. Springville City. 725 P.2d 1360,1364
(Utah 1986); DCR Inc. v. Peak Alarm Co.. 663 P.2d 433,436 (Utah 1983).
Failure to do so could give rise to liability on the part of the responsible
party. Thus, we hold that Nelson's suit is not barred by section
63-30-10(11) of the Governmental Immunity Act.
The result reached in Nelson would be no different had a city employee physically
parted the fence and watched the little boy go through and into the canal to drown. The same
effect is reached in this case. The knowing exposure to the greater risk is common to both
cases. Here, however, the Defendants below "parted the fence" and knowingly exposed
Appellant and others to foreseeable harm.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.
DATED this {^_

day of February, 2001.
BRAUNBERGER^tf OUD & DRAPER, P.C.

Tad D. Draper /
Attorney for Appellant
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ADDENDUM
Utah Code Annotated §53-2-102(2) and (8)
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Transcript of Oral Argument on Summary Judgment

D

26

AnmrxrriTTiv/r

A

UT Code § 53-2-102, Definitions
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Utah Code § 53-2-102

WEST'S UTAH CODE
TITLE 53. PUBLIC SAFETY
CHAPTER 2. COMPREHENSIVE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
ACT
(Information regarding effective dates, repeals, etc. is provided subsequently in
this document)
Current through End of 2000 General Sess.
§ 53-2-102. Definitions
As used in this chapter:
(1) "Attack" means a nuclear, conventional, biological, or chemical warfare action against the United
States of America or this state.
(2) "Disaster" means a situation causing, or threatening to cause, widespread damage, social disruption,
or injury or loss of life or property resulting from attack, internal disturbance, natural phenomena, or
technological hazard.
(3) "Director" means the division director appointed under Section 53-2-103.
(4) "Division" means the Comprehensive Emergency Management Division created in Section
53-2-103.
(5) "Expenses" means actual labor costs of government and volunteer personnel, including workers
compensation benefits, fringe benefits, administrative overhead, cost of equipment, cost of equipment
operation, cost of materials, and the cost of any contract labor and materials.
(6) "Hazardous materials emergency" means a sudden and unexpected release of any substance that
because of its quantity, concentration, or physical, chemical, or infectious characteristics presents a direct and
immediate threat to public safety or the environment and requires immediate action to mitigate the threat.
(7) "Internal disturbance" means ariot,prison break, disruptive terrorism, or strike.
(8) "Natural phenomena" means any earthquake, tornado, storm, flood, landslide, avalanche, forest or
rangefire,drought, or epidemic.
(9) "State of emergency" means a condition in any part of this state that requires state government
emergency assistance to supplement the local efforts of the affected political subdivision to save lives and to
protect property, public health, welfare, and safety in the event of a disaster, or to avoid or reduce the threat
of a disaster.
(10) "Technological hazard" means any hazardous materials accident, mine accident, train derailment,
air crash, radiation incident, pollution, structuralfire,or explosion.
Copyright (c) West Group 2000 No claim to original U.S. Govt, works
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Utah Code § 63-30-3

WEST'S UTAH CODE
TITLE 63. STATE AFFAIRS IN GENERAL
CHAPTER 30. GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT
(Information regarding effective dates, repeals, etc. is provided subsequently in
this document)
Current through End of 2000 General Sess.

§ 63-30-3. Immunity of governmental entities from suit
(1) Except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter, all governmental entities are immune from suit
for any injury which results from the exercise of a governmental function, governmentally-owned hospital,
nursing home, or other governmental health care facility, and from an approved medical, nursing, or other
professional health care clinical training program conducted in either public or private facilities.
(2)(a) For the purposes of this chapter only, the following state medical programs and services
performed at a state-owned university hospital are unique or essential to the core of governmental activity in
this state and are considered to be governmental functions:
(i) care of a patient referred by another hospital or physician because of the high risk nature of the
patients medical condition;
(ii) high risk care or procedures available in Utah only at a state-owned university hospital or provided
in Utah only by physicians employed at a state-owned university acting in the scope of their employment;
(iii) care of patients who cannot receive appropriate medical care or treatment at another medical
facility in Utah; and
(iv) any other service or procedure performed at a state-owned university hospital or by physicians
employed at a state-owned university acting in the scope of their employment that a court finds is unique or
essential to the core of governmental activity in this state.
(b) If any claim under this subsection exceeds the limits established in Section 63-30-34, the claimant
may submit the excess claim to the Board of Examiners and the Legislature under Title 63, Chapter 6.
(3) The management of flood waters and other natural disasters and the construction, repair, and
operation of flood and storm systems by governmental entities are considered to be governmental fimctions,
and governmental entities and their officers and employees are immune from suit for any injury or damage
resulting from those activities.
(4) Officers and employees of a Children's Justice Center are immune from suit for any injury which
results from their joint intergovernmental functions at a center created in Title 62A, Chapter 4.
*21738
As last amended by Chapters 15 and 248, Laws of Utah 1991.
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§ 63-30-10, Waiver o f immunity
employee—Exceptions

„...., caused bj negligent act oi omission of

Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury proximately caused by a negligent
act or omission of an employee committed within the scope of employment except if the injury arises out of,
in connection with, or results from:
(1) the exercise or perlonniini'i' *.i Ik Ltihn1 la ^; \eieisi oi |vilomi a discretionary' 1 unction, whether or
not the discretion is abused;
(2) assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, intentional trespass, abuse
of process, libel, slander, deceit, interference with contract rights, infliction of mental anguish, or violation of
civil rights;
P I lj i e i s s u a n c e > denial, suspension, or revocation of or by the failure or refusal to issue, deny, suspend,
or revoke any permit, license certificate, approval, order, or similar authorization;
(4) a failure to make an inspection or by making an inadequate or negligent inspection;

without probable cause;
(6) a misrepresentation bj an empl :»)/ ee "whether or not it is negligent or intentional;
i ') riots, unlaw iul assemblies, public demonstrations, mob violence, and civil disturbances,

(9) the activities of the Utah National Guard;
(10) the incarceration nl aim nrron ill iin "lulu1 piisnii imiiih HI I ih Mil m other place oi legal
confinement;
(11) any natural condition on publicly owned or controlled lands, any condition existing in connection
with an abandoned mine or mining operation, or any activity authorized by the School and Institutional Trust
Lands Administration or the Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands;
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, mentation of cloud management 01 seeding f"01 the clearing of fog;

(13) the management of flood waters, earthquakes, or natural disasters;
i

-JJ"-4* i\5t me H)era»iop
requirements of Sect: on 4 '
-;

: an cmergene> vehicle whi'e hung driven i 1:1 accordance with the

i •*>) a lalem ...u^i ..- .;
Jefcctne condition of any highway, road, street, alle> , crosswalk,
sidewalk. culvert. \urncl bridge. \ laduct, or othei structure located on them;
. *aiLiu i^ujgj: . or latent <!'L \ . - • liiion of ,\\\\ |iiililn IIHIIIIJIIH1 IIIIH limn tLiiiiii icsrn iill i»r
i, : - p'lDiu: improvemen
(18) the acti\ ities c f :
(a) providing emergency medical assistance;
(
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;:

(c) regulating, mitigatmu or handling hazardous materials or hazardous wastes;
(

-

(ei intervening curing dam emergencies; or
(. vi the exercise ur performance or the failui e to exercise or perform any function pursuant to Title 73,
inter ^a or Title ?'? Chapter 10 which immunity is in addition to all other immunities granted by law
6; I i ms 1995, c, 299, § 35, eff. May I, 1995; Laws 1996, c 159, § 6, eff July 1, 1996; Laws 1996,
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P R O C E E D I N G S.
HIE COURT: This is the matter of Paul Blacki ten: v, State
of Utah, et al; Case No. 990906368
Counsel, will you enter your appearances, please.
MB:.. DRAPER: Your Honor, Tad Draper here on behalf of Paul
Blackner.
MS. STEINVOORT: Sandra Steinvoort on "behalf of 'the State
of Utah, Department of Transportation.
ME RICHARDS: Dave Richards on 'behalf of the Town of
II11 Alto,
II
THE COURT: Now, there are two motions for summary
judgment. 'They appear to me to raise very similar issues.
II
Mr. Draper, do you .see a distinction or should I just have
4 the Defendants argue their motions ~
15
MR. DRAPER: I don't see a distinction. It's their
16 motions, but I think that they're all the same issues.
I
FHE COURT: All right. Let's go ahead. I'll hear from
18 'the 'Defendants in 'this case, and whoever wishes to speak, first
19 may proceed, and then I'll (Inaudible)
]
;0
MS. STEINVOORT: Thank you, Yoi"
71 for just a moment? (Handing).
Mr. Richards and I were discussing this earlier. ""VI e
23 assume that the Court's pretty familiar with 'the facts of 'this
24 case, and I'm not sure how much you want us to go into it other
2 5 than say that there w a s an avalanche that occurred in Little
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Cottonwood Canyon in March of 1998, and. Mr. Blackner was
injured along with other people as a result of that avalanche.
Our argument today and our motion is basal on the argument
of immunity, which we feel are entitled. ~ it isn't - is
available to us because of 63-30-10 (11), which 'talks about:
"Immunity is preserved for conditions
which arise out of a natural condition on
a public land."
I think the facts are fairly 'undisputed in terms of a
situation on, that particular day. It is a state road
U.D.O.T. has the sole authority to close 'that road. .An
avalanche occurred. If you look at the diagram here, White
Pine Chute, Number 3, which traveled to one lane of traffic on
the road, preventing traffic from going up and down the
canyon. U D O.T. was called The avalanche forecaster, Dave
Medara (phonetic), arrived at 'the scene, evaluated it. T h e
Alta Town Marshal also came to the scene to help coordinate
traffic. Mr. Medara continued down the road, came back and
noticed mat all of the traffic was stopped because a front-end
loader was .removing the snow trom *Jtie road
wa^ ai th.
time that the second avalanche occurred ar- L•« *, i>i * - # :
everyone off the road.
This is a situation when* . «)i v lid IO1 %pxr :>
avalanche. It wasn't an avalanche control effort It was an,
unexpected situation. And if called to testify, the avalanche

Page 4
forecasters would tell you that white Pine Chute 3 and 4 are
the ones that most infrequently run. So, the fact that White
Pine Chute ran, Number 4, ran that particular day, and ran
across the road, was completely 'unexpected.
We think there is a strong policy argument in addition to
the immunity aspect of this case which is quite clear that we
can't be second-guessed in making these decisions. The first
avalanche occurred at 2:19, the second one occurred at 2:44
There: was a very quick time frame here in which to respond and
to make an evaluation. At all times when Mr. Medara was on the
road, he was evaluating the avalanche situation. He was trying
try coordinate and decide whether or not the whole road should
^e closed; and that would mean,, in, essence, locking people up
at Snowbird and .Alta and preventing people from the coming up
the canyon. And that decision isn't made lightly. It has to
be made after considering the conditions and consulting with
•ther individuals like Alta and Snowbird to advise them of
that's going to be happening.
We just think that immunity is quite clear here. We know
that Mr. Draper has argued about the special relationship, and
I will allow him to address that and then respond to that. Your
lonor. But we don't 'believe a, special relationship argument is
necessary when immunity is quite clear and state! in 'the Code.
Do you have any questions?
THE COURT: Thank you.
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•:*• -!H ifAKDS: oood morning, Your Honor.
rH i- f (>I:R r Good mora ing.
MK KECHARDS; [just want to point out a couple of things
in the memoranda that I think are important. I think first of
all it's real important that the Plaintiff has accepted as true
all of the facts that arc alleged and set forth in the
memoranda Alta submitted For purposes of summary judgment,
those arc deemed as accepted by both, sides. And under those
set of facte, it's pretty obvious, I 'think, 'that the injury
occurred during the management of a natural disaster. The
Plaintiff supplied the •definition of a natural, disaster from
the Comprehensive Emergency Management Act from the State, and
that Act basically says that if an injury occurs - and it
define!* a "natural disaster" as a situation "threatening to
cause injury or property damage as a result of a natural
phenomenon." And I can't imagine something more on point: in
this case. As Ms. Steinvoort, indicated, there is absolutely
no indication that the avalanche was caused by humans. It
certainly wasn't triggered through U.D.O.T.'s effort. And they
'.have the ability and responsibility to control avalanche danger
in Little Cottonwood Canyon. I should say, 'except for the'
resorts, themselves, just to be fair. Obviously this didn't,
happen on resort property.
The first avalanche occurs. Dave Mcdara, U.D.0,T."" s
avalanche forecaster responsible for the whole canyon meets
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the second avalanche lets go. And hits, obviously, 'the traffic
including the Plaintiff's vehicle.
But I think what's important trom,, that, is to understand
this all happened within 34 minutes. And in that 34 minutes,
you have the guy responsible for avalanche control in the whole
canyon and 'the marshal on duty that met at the scene, came up
with a plan, decided what was best: and implemented it And. I
guess if they would have had another 30 seconds, there may not
have been a, problem. But those are the kind of decisions that
gin ei nment entities have to make during a natural disaster,
You don't delegate those 'type of •decisions And. I 'think as a
policy matter 'hindsight, Monday morning quarterbacking of those
type of decisions is easy to do but it's darn hard for those
people that have made the decisions to - to see those Monda>
morning quarterbacking calls at the time 'they arc: 'trying to
prevent loss of human life and property damage.
The other - the other issue we raise was the natural
condition of public land. And, again, I can't think of
anything more natural on public land than a naturally occurring
avalanche in Little Cottonwood Canyon in the middle of a
wilderness area And I think 'both of 'them, are; directly on
point.
I am going to sit down, If the Co 11n Iw, s . i 11 111 m itrs 111)11 s
I'd 'be happy to address them,,.
THE COURT: Thank you, Counsel.
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Alta's Deputy Town Marshal at the scene where this avalanche is
partially blocking the road. They talk about what to do. Dave
Medara says, "I'm going to go down canyon. I need to take a
look at a couple more slide paths. See what's going on " What
was going on, was unusual And, I don't know if you read some of
the attachments, but it was an unusual March day inasmuch as it
was really warm and there was no wind. And so you had a lot of
a wet slabs letting go, apparently. Regardless, Mr. Medara
wants to go down canyon and take a look, at a couple of
additional slide paths to see what's going on.
Kevin Payne (phonetic), Alta's Deputy Town Marshal, says.,
"Fine. Let's call a front-end loader in from Snowbird and get
this debris off the road," because traffic was 'trying to make
its way around this using one lane and he saw 'the danger in
that. And while Medara went down, Payne continued to allow one
lane to go and stop it, allow the other lane to go until the
front-aid loader arrived ten or fifteen minutes later. The
front-end loader went to work and in a matter of about ten
minutes had most of the snow pushed off.
Kevin Payne gets a phone — gets a radio call when the
loader was on its last load saying, "This is Dave Medara. Iin
down at the bottom. I've assessed conditions in the canyon. I
'think where we've got traffic stopped. I'm a little nervous
about it. How much longer do you have?" And Mr. Payne said,
"We arc on oi ir last load "" He said ""Fine." Within seconds,
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(inaudible) statute we are dealing with, Your

. ur Honor, for us to lose this motion today, the Court
must find that this avalanche was a natural disaster, was a
disaster. I mean, we have — if the Court finds that it was,
ven >v And I want you to' — if you, would, Your Honor, please
look at Subparagraph A of the statute I've given you, 53-2-102,
"Natural Phenomenon." It specifically identifies an avalanche
as a natural phenomenon.
* ~a,o a natural phenomenon 'become a disaster? If you
*OK up at Number 2, it tells you that:
"A 'disaster' means a situation
iiising or threatening to cause
widespread damage, social disruption or
. j or loss of life or property
-evjiting from, attack, (and there it is)
natural phenomenon'."
an avalanche in and of itself does not create a
disaster 1: has to fit within the parameters of that
ichnr.'on.
Nn*, if Mr. Blackner, who's sitting back there in the back
r u
* - *• -room, were driving up that highway,, up that road,

Page 11

Page 9

Ie's got the radio. They have 'been 'talking about what's

1 and an avalanche wiped him nut. then: >- M< case There is
2 absolutely no claim... Because wr \MIUK1 .icrec n is - i' "•* :.ci

nanienir.g with the avalanche up the hill that they arc; dealing

3 a natural condition because that's a static circumstance

wiu. And then '.he drives right on up and parks his vehicle

4 That's snow. That's the Grand Canyon. That's things like

-

ngnt wnere they are cleaning up. He gets out of his vehicle.

5 that. But the natural phenomenon is something dynamic that

Mr Blackner gets out. All these people are out looking at

6 happens in nature without anyone's involvement. And we agree,

iv* ivalane.be cleanup thing.
s

nd all. of a sudden "run " So, 'he makes a 'dive for his

7 wc are not claiming that the)/" started 'this avalanche: oi ilii t
8 they had direct cause of putting the avalanche into motion. If

- car ,iiid. of course, he's "wiped out along with several other
oeonie

9 Mr. Blackner were driving up the canyon, an avalanche wipes him

s

10 out, there is no case.
11

12 Your Honor ~ is that the avalanche that took out Mr. Blackner
13 is not the avalanche that they were cleaning up And that's

12 anyone, to be responsible for something that just naturally
113 occurs. And this same avalanche could have gotten
14 Mr. Blackner, this very same avalanche, Mr. Blackner, undo

14 the critical distinction.
15

our Honor, I want it to "be really understood, I don't in

i\ v way expect somebody, 'the State of "Utah, the City of Alta,

Well, why is this such a good case? Well, the reason is,

What did 'the avalanche 'that they were cleaning up cause?

16 It doesn 't even fit the definition of a disaster. The one they

115 different circumstances and 'there is no case. But where he's
116 stopped right there and 'they are not in 'the process of cleaning
17 up a disaster and they even directed him - we are dealing witl

17 were cleaning up was not threatening to cause widespread
18 damage, social disruption or injury, of loss of life or

18 an issue of instructional - putting - placing the public in

19 property. It was snow on the' road And it wouldn't have an.)

19 harm's way. Now, that's not an immune function under any

20 more of a consequence than if 'there '.had 'been, a nasty car

120 stretch of the imagination. And for 'the Court to rale in favi

21 accident up there on the highway. They don't call it a

21 of their motion, they must - Your Honor must determine that

22 disaster because there is a car accident. It still requires

22 they were in the process of cleaning up a disaster. And where

23 traffic to move. It requires people directing traffic and

23 is ~ the slightest indication? The only damage and injury was

24 managing 'that aspect of it.

24 one

.25

,25 thereafter.

So, we have an event that takes place, We .have a natural

I

you .'know,, the accident - 'the avalanche that followed
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Page 10
1 phenomenon which in and of itself means nothing. And 'they are

1

2 cleaning it up,, They are not under any definition, any stretch

2 claimed, exemptions from immunity, fly. For purposes of this

3

I motion, the Court must consider negligence, that there was

I

if the definition, 'dealing "with, a disaster.

I don't think any of the other exceptions that they've

\ negligence and is there immunity? That's the basis of their

Now, 'they did create a disaster. These .guys stoppcxi

5 traffic right under White Pines Chute Number 4. What did they

5 motion,

6 say? I heard her say, "completely unexpected." There are

6

/'" signs all up that road, everybody is aware of them, about

3 questions, that's the nuts and bolts of where this - where uV

8 avalanche danger, and no stopping or standing. They '.had every

8 law, I think, sits on this thing. The only 'thing I .repent is

9 opportunity to stop these cars at some other place. They chose
maybe somewhat of a silly analogy but, I think, on point, let's

1.2 use 'the Grand Canyon. Let's suppose there's an accident right
1.1.3 along the side of road that goes along the Grand Canyon

9 not having filed my own. motion for the: Court to determine ;-v
10 under the facts as we know them and the affidavits submits

10 to stop them there. And if the Court will indulge me with
! 11

And so, Your Honor, I think that ~ unless you have any

And

11 that this was not a disaster. This avalanche was not
12 threatening to cause widespread damage, social disorder,
13 injury, loss of life, et cetera.. I mean

my final comment,

14 it is a car accident. And they have traffic control. And the

14 Your Honor: If you look at 1-15, what a .mess that is. Ever)

15 crazy traffic officer is directing people to go off the edge of

15 time there is a accident on 1-15, do we determine that that's a

16 the Grand Canyon. Now, 'this is as absurd as stopping somebody

16 disaster? I mean, everyone colloquially will say, "Hey, man,

1"i

1 i that's a disaster up there on the freeway." But legal

in an ava.lanc.he zone, I agree But, you, .know, like lemmings

18 these cars just keep plunging over the side. And then they

18 'definition? You know, and 'that's ~ 'that's 'traffic at; its

19 come in and argue immunity because it is a natural phenomenon

19 worst. You '.have an accident or event that affects a few people

20 or a natural condition. "We're exempt from immunity (sic)."

20 in an isolated circumstance, and they have the ability to

21

21 control it but choose not to, in fact, to control it

1 he issue here is proximate cause And the cause of

22 Mr. Blackner being wiped out and stopped and parked 'there is

22 incompetently by placing people under an avalanche chute. Thai

2.3 because he was instructed and. told to do so.

23 there is responsibility and not immunity.

24

24

THE COURT: Thank you, Counsel.

25

MS. STEINVOORT: Just one thing,

Now, he's at the bottom of the canyon driving up that

25 road, and Mr. Medara is in a U.D.O.T. vehicle driving up the

v
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ix'w pimtographs heir 'ilustrate why we perceive it as a

• : >- - property or 'life because of foui things

tisaster And I provided these to Counsel before. 'Hie first

via* k

pnoiograph f* 11 (Inaudible) is — they are both -- as you can
4 see, the snow on the top of the photograph is the first
"i avalanche And it's hard to explain and express how fast this

. am not sure what that is, but I'll leave it

to une Court's imagination, - internal disturbance, natural
I phenomena or technological hazards. So, this statute doesn't
' *>
• make everything a natural disaster. It doesn't make 'the wreck

6 happened Mr. Medara was at 'his post at Alta, .he gets the call

fn the side of the road a natural disaster. It makes

7 at 2:19 and lie responds. It is our position that it is a

* KIT*. r>read waits that .result from, the natura- r iienomenon that

8 natural condition, that it was unexpected, that - Mr V

threaten human life and threaten property ««: n<*: .-a! disaster.

9 was caught in 'the same avalanche, 'went oil die side r/ -

It might not have been the biggest natural disaster that's ever

10 road. It wasn't as if he was deliberately putting people in

10 hit rht- state, but it certainly was a natural condition that

11 harm's way. The traffic was not flowing, Your Honor, it was

cned life and threatened property. Why else was Kevin

12 slowed down. And the question was: "How do we get this

t'ayne there directing traffic and letting one lane go at a time

cleared up in order to get people moving along?" And the

and not letting opposing lanes of traffic share one lane? I

•LX j*ion was made to bring up the front-end loader and cleaz

think it's pretty obvious that it is - it's darn dangerous to

she traffic. And, of course, now we all say, "Well, gosh, wish

io *JI r. and that's why the Town Marshal at Alta, Deputy Tow n

* we hadn't done that." But at the time it seemed to be the most

Mar .nai. was there tryingto'prevent people from running into

prudent, practical thing to do, rather than having people

sach other so they weren't injured themselves.

* slipe-sliding back and forth. The same group of people would

So, was it a huge natural disaster? No. Was it a natural

19 have 'been sitting under this traffic chute. Maybe it wouldn't

disaster under this statute? You bet it was,

20 have been Mr. Blackner directly. It could have been another

Tiat's probably all I need to add at 'this point, I did

21 individual. There's certainly about nine statements from

^i:

add, though: I don't 'think, we addressed the natural

22 people who all went off the side of the road who experienced

22 condition of public land as being an avalanche. I mean,

23 it It was unexpected. It was a natural condition. We arc

23 Mr. Draper says: "If you find this was a natural disaster, he

24 entitled to immunity as a result of that. And the legislature

24 loses." I think I agree with him. He also forgot to add: "If

25 has made that decision. We cannot go back and second-guess

25 you find that an avalanche is a natural conditio!' f the publ
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t.'-j.A that are made to wonuj. u:i avalanche or to manage an
Adianche situation that occurs unexpectedly on a Saturday
3

afternoon,

l

TOE

Ki. rhank you
Thr Court is going to grant the motion for summary

COURT: Thank you, Counsel.

:- .-udgment for both .Department of Transportation and 'the Cit> of

5

MS. STEINVOORT: Thank you.

6

THE COURT: Anything more you (inaudible).

6 Alta. It's the Court's view in examining the applicable

7

MR RICHARDS: Just real briefly. Thank you.

7 statute that though there's certainly some basis for discussion

8

I'm not sure 'that Mr. Draper was actually sayint: ...

9 natural phenomenon can't be a disaster under this stai JV.

- and I think Plaintiff has done an excellent job of raising
9 the other way of examining this, it's the Court's view 'that the

10 think he - I think that is what he is saying -

!n

11

11 that - that the avalanche is a natural phenomenon, it is

MR, DRAPER: That is what I'm saying. It can, be

12 (Inaudible) -13

MR. RICHARDS: - which eliminates epidemics, droughts

14 forest fires, avalanches, landslides, floods, storms, tornados

intention as communicated by the legislature in 'this statute is

12 certainly a natural condition of the land and that the - a
13 disaster is a situation that causes widespread damage to
14 property that results from natural, phenomenon. And in the

15 and earthquakes. I ' m left wondering what other sort of things 15 Court's view this sort of condition would follow in the
16 description of "widespread damage" and would therefore be

16 could actually occur that aren't natural disasters. Maybe

17 pestilence, Maybe we've forgotten pestilence. But I don"l

17 within the statute and would allow the immunity to the entities

18 think that's the intent of the statute, is to say that a

18 that are sued here as the Defendants.

19 natural phenomenon can't be a natural disaster. I think that

19

I'm going to ask Ms. Steinvoort; if she would prepare an

20 it's obvious that natural phenomena cause natural disasters all 20 order to that effect.
21 the time

And I think it is also important to point out that

22 Mr. Draper's example of the car accident or directing traffic

21

MS. STEINVOORT I will.

2,2

MR RICHARDSI Your Honor, might I ask? Is the. Court

23 off the side of the Grand Canyon, it wouldn't fall under

23 going to issue specific findings about loss or prepo

24 natural disaster. Because natural disasters, as according to

24 anything? I mean, I don't know if the Cour *. .-•<•

25 this statute, arc situations that threaten to cause injury to

25 special findings or we are just going to g< :l

^

L

1
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(Inaudible),,,
TOE COURT,: I'd be comfortable, Counsel, if you would
prepare findings that would find both the disaster and the
natural condition law (Inaudible) Court indicated verbally.
MR DRAPFR Your Honor, my specific request in that
-.- • •
i • .-• -sot trving to argue on that, but in terms
/ oi aenning the "'natural disaster," the elements have to be met
8 (Inaudible), with — is the Court going to make specific
9 findings on the elements of the disaster that's listed
10 (Inaudible) III III rae COURT: That's my intention. I've asked Counsel to
1 ? prepare such an,, order and such findings, Thank you,
II3 Mr, Draper.
114
(Hearing adjourned.)
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